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By Jonathan Freeberg
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Abstract
What can the Hungarian and Polish experiences teach us about the processes of
decreasing judicial independence, and how does a decrease in judicial independence
affect judicial trust and quality of governance? This paper process-traces the erosion of
judicial independence in Hungary and Poland from 1989-2021, highlighting different
mechanisms that lead to decreases in judicial autonomy. The cases show that formal
reforms and informal changes to the membership of the judiciary are both effective at
decreasing the independence of the judiciary. The data does not support that these
changes lead to significant changes in judicial independence or quality of governance.
The popularity of the governments enacting these reforms is a potential explanation for
this lack of a significant relationship.

Introduction
Hungary and Poland have both experienced major changes in the structure and
power of their judiciaries over the past two decades. Independence and judicial review
have both been substantially reduced by the Hungarian Fidesz party and the Polish Law
and Justice party, which has in turn reduced the separation of powers in each
government. Both these countries possessed strong judiciaries that were seen as a
model for other burgeoning democracies, and both experienced rapid declines from
2010-2020. What can be learned from the Hungarian and Polish experience regarding
judicial independence, and have these experiences led to substantial impacts on
institutional trust and separation of powers? This will be done through careful review of

significant events in the modern histories of each country, coupled with analysis of data
about the countries.
Judicial independence and trust in the judiciary are the primary variables of
concern in this paper. Judicial independence is a hotly debated topic, since at first
glance it may appear less democratic than a judiciary completely responsive to popular
support and elected officials for its decision-making. However, a judiciary must be able
to make decisions independently of elected officials if it is to regulate and check the
power of those elected officials (Kaufman 1980, Cameron 2010). When a judiciary has
this independence reduced, as will be shown has happened in Hungary and Poland,
then the government loses a primary check on its power.
The quality and independence of judicial institutions should be a concern for all
citizens of democratic countries. As demonstrated by Hungary and Poland, the
institutions of a democracy can erode fairly quickly without any violent regime changes.
As an important check on the power of legislative and executive authority, judicial
branches are central to preventing government overreach. As concerns grow in other
nations, including the United States, about the independence and power of their
judiciaries, Hungary and Poland are interesting case studies to see how these
institutions fail. Beyond that, the importance of strong governments in Eastern Europe
has recently come to the forefront with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As countries
that border Ukraine, the actions and rhetoric taken by the governments of Hungary and
Poland are under increased scrutiny.
Trust in the judiciary is one of the many different types of trust that a citizen can
possess. These include generalized social trust, specific social trust, specific

institutional trust, political trust, and more. When discussing institutional trust, citizens
can have different degrees of trust for the Parliament, judicial branch, executive branch,
bureaucracies, and more. While all of these different types of trust are different and can
exist independently from one another, they share some connections and correlations.
Trust in the judiciary may be the type of trust this inquiry is primarily focused on, but it is
by no means the only one. Trust in the judiciary can have significant effects on the rule
of law in a country, economic efficiency, political stability, and trust in other
governmental institutions.
Next, an overview of Hungary and Poland’s 20th and 21st century histories will
be provided. Parallels are clear, as both countries share many common experiences
from the end of World War I until the modern day. Both countries spent their interwar
years ruled by an authoritarian regime of a military leader. Both nations were occupied
by the Nazi government and later the Soviets. Both countries shared a long period of
communist rule from the end of World War II until the fall of the Soviet Union, when both
countries established democracies and later joined the EU. Later, both nations saw the
rise of populist right-wing political parties that began eroding democratic institutions.
The different political tools utilized by each party, along with the similarities in the final
outcomes, provides a unique look at how democratic institutions like the judiciary can
erode.
Notably, these countries differed in how formal the erosion of the judiciary was.
Hungary decreased the independence of their judiciary through formal constitutional
reform. This was possible because the Fidesz party controlled over two-thirds of the
seats in parliament. In Poland, the Law and Justice party had a simple majority and so

could not amend the constitution without support from the opposition. The alternative
used in Poland was through statutory changes, court packing, and refusal to comply
with the court’s orders. Although the methods were substantially different, the end result
of a court that simply approves laws passed by the government was the same.
Lastly, political data will be used to observe objective changes in the quality of
democracy in these countries. The differences in these outcomes over time allow us to
see how political and social shifts have real outcomes in the data, and compare the
countries. Significantly, the judicial independence and quality of government both began
sharply declining after Fidesz took power in Hungary and Law and Justice took power in
Poland. Although judicial autonomy cannot be directly tied to these changes, it is clear
that the policies of these governments are having and effect. Notably, trust in the
government has been rising during this period, perhaps as a result of the populist nature
of these regimes. This section will include data analysis of judicial independence and
governmental trust, which will show a weakly significant negative correlation. This
correlation is barely significant with a small amount of data, which does not lead to a
confident conclusion. Also included will be an analysis of political corruption and
governmental trust, but a relationship will not be found at all.
Overall, the erosion of judicial independence in Hungary and Poland offers an
opportunity to learn about how democratic institutions can deteriorate over time. In an
era of increasing populism around the globe and conflict in Eastern Europe, learning
about significant political and institutional changes can help us understand changes in
the future.
Literature Review

What is Judicial Independence?
When discussing judicial independence, we are not talking about a court with
absolutely no constraints. A completely independent court that could decide whatever it
wanted based on the whims of the judge would be antithetical to our beliefs about rule
of law (Burbank 2003, Ferejohn 1999). Most courts are meant to limit their decisions to
ones firmly grounded in the constitution or statutes created by the legislature (Burbank
2003). Although these courts are not independent to decide laws without justification,
they can still be independent.
Judicial independence can be defined as the ability of judges to make their
decisions without interference or fear of retribution by other powers (Burbank 2003,
Burbank 1999). This is important, because it allows for “judges free of congressional
and executive control [to] be in a position to determine whether the assertion of power
against the citizen is consistent with law” (Bator 1990, p.268). For a country to have
effective separation of powers, judges must be free from worrying about the short term
desires of elected officials (Kaufman 1980, Cameron 2010).
Later on in this paper, we will discuss how Poland and Hungary have changed
the structure of the court to force judges to comply with the current officeholders. This
erosion of the separation of powers means the ruling parties have fewer checks on their
power, and can pass laws that would have been struck down with an independent court.
What is trust?
The definitions of trust are as broad as the scholarship regarding it, but there are
several definitions that have risen to the forefront. Distinctions must also be made
between the different types of trust in order to ensure precision in discussions. In this

literature review I will begin by discussing different definitions of trust, followed by an
examination of the importance of judicial trust, and end with a discussion of theories
about the origin and contributing factors toward judicial trust.
One of the most popular ways to define trust is the encapsulated interest model.
This model is championed by scholars like Russell Hardin, Margaret Levi, and Susan
Rose-Ackerman. Russell Hardin defines encapsulated interest as when “you… have
your own interests in taking my interests into account” (Hardin 2002 p.1). Essentially, if it
is in the trustee’s self-interest to fulfill the truster’s interest, then they have encapsulated
the truster’s interest into their own. This is considered a relational model of trust,
because it deals with the way people interact with each other and depends on the
specific context of the relationship.
Encapsulated interest is tied not only to trust but also trustworthiness. Trust is the
amount the truster believes the trustee to be trustworthy. Trustworthiness is tied not only
to how much the trustee has encapsulated the interest of the truster, but also to the
perceived competence of the trustee in fulfilling that interest (Levi and Stoker 2000). It is
possible for an institution or individual to be generally trustworthy but not trusted, and
vice versa. This is because trust does not actually depend on the trustworthiness of the
trustee, but the perceptions of trustworthiness as well as the specifics of the
relationship.
Another common way of looking at trust is the dispositional approach. The
central idea of dispositional trust is that some people are simply more inclined to trust
than others, due primarily to differences in upbringing and institutional environments.
This theory of trust does not rely on finding context in each relationship, but rather on

assessing whether someone believes most people are trustworthy (Hardin 2002).
Dispositional trust is not mutually exclusive with encapsulated interest, since it could
simply reflect someone’s tendency to believe others have encapsulated their interest.
Next, there is a difference between interpersonal and institutional trust.
Interpersonal trust is the amount an individual trusts other members of society (Rahn
and Transue 1998). Within interpersonal trust, there are two important types. These are
bonding and bridging trust (Putnam 2000). Bonding trust is the type of trust that occurs
when people have high degrees of trust for those they know and share similar
characteristics with. Bridging trust is the level of trust people have for members of
society outside their social group. For an extremely simplified example, if a softball team
only trusted members of its own team and no one else, then this team would have high
bonding trust and low bridging trust. But if a fruit stand owner felt confident leaving their
stand unattended and trusted people to pay for any fruit they took, this owner would
have high bridging trust. Bridging trust is typically seen as a positive thing, while
bonding trust is typically seen as negative (Putnam 2000).
Institutional trust is the level of trust individuals have in institutions to encapsulate
their own interests. When it is referred to as political trust it is in reference to the degree
of trust individuals have for the entirety of government. However, institutional trust
allows for the disaggregation of institutions. There is some evidence that shows that
building trust in one institution impacts opinions of other institutions (Montinola 2009,
Caldeira 1986, Rohrschneider 2005). However, there is also evidence showing that
people are able to disaggregate institutions from one another (Grimmelikhuijsen and
Klijn 2015, Gibson et al. 1998).

It should be noted that bonding interpersonal trust, bridging interpersonal trust,
political trust, and specific institutional trust are often found to be heavily entangled
(Mizrahi et al. 2020, Zmerli and van der Meer 2017, Liu and Stolle 2017). So while it is
important to understand the differences between all the different types of trust, it would
be incorrect to view them all as completely separate entities. Understanding any of
these types of trust requires some understanding of all of them.
Why Does Trust Matter?
Trust is a popular area of study in political science research because it affects so
many different areas of citizenship. It is necessary to form large organizations, maintain
peace of mind, and participate politically (Zmerli and van der Meer 2017). Different
types of trust impact nations in different ways.
First, the question must be asked whether high levels of trust is even a desirable
characteristic. Russell Hardin explains that classical liberalism argues for a general
distrust of government and government officials in order to keep a handle on tyranny
(Hardin 1999). However, it is possible to design a government that is trustworthy even if
every official in it is a “knave” (Hume 1742). This can be done by designing systems and
incentives for officials to encapsulate the interests of the public. Democracy is adopted
primarily because of a distrust of government and desire to keep political power in the
hands of the general citizenry (Warren 2017). This is why it is important to separate trust
in institutions from trust in individuals. For example, it is possible to trust the idea of
Congress and the checks and balances it employs without trusting the individual
members of Congress. While these are often entangled with each other, they are
separate ideas (Norris 2017).

So what does trusting the institutions actually accomplish? Levi, Stoker, and Tyler
all find that individuals who trust the government are more likely to comply with
regulations and laws (Levi and Stoker 2000, Tyler 1990). This is tied primarily to belief in
the legitimacy of legal institutions and laws rather than fear of coercion. When people do
not break the law, the state can spend less on law enforcement and legal systems. This
allows legal institutions to be smaller than in societies where compliance is low.
Those who are distrusting of the government are also less likely to support
incumbents, and more likely to support anti-governmental policies such as lower taxes
and lower regulation (Levi and Stoker 2000). It is debatable whether this finding is
positive, negative, or neutral, but it is potentially useful for analyzing political trends in a
country.
Trusting the courts is necessary for enforcing contracts and maintaining efficient
market transactions. Examples of succeeding without strong courts do exist, but they
are generally less efficient and come with a host of other problems (Mcmillan and
Woodruff 1999). When citizens trust the courts to fairly and predictably settle disputes,
they are more likely to self-mediate these disputes. This increases efficiency and
lessens the cost of enforcement and dispute resolution.
What Influences Trust in the Judiciary?
The first theory of institutional trust is that it depends primarily on corruption in
the government. This is advocated strongly by Susan Rose-Ackerman and Bo
Rothstein. Empirical evidence shows a clear connection between perceptions of
corruption and institutional trust (Cleary and Stokes 2009, Levi and Stoker 2000). From
an encapsulated interest model perspective, evidence of corruption would cause

citizens to question whether the government has truly encapsulated the interests of the
citizenry. If someone is using their political position for personal gain outside the
accepted mechanisms then they would appear to be acting in their own interest in a way
potentially at odds with the interests of their supporters. An accepted mechanism of
using a political position for personal gain would be advocating for policies that increase
the likelihood of re-election by increasing popularity among the citizenry. While this will
help the politician by continuing their career, a good system is designed to coordinate
this incentive with the desires of the citizenry.
Beyond corruption at the elite levels of government, low-level everyday
corruption can reduce political trust as well. Bo Rothstein explains how corruption leads
to reductions in generalized social trust with a three-part causal mechanism (Rothstein
2004). First, if public officials are known for being corrupt, then citizens will conclude
that other people cannot be trusted either. Second, if citizens see that most people in
society engage in corruption, they will conclude that most people cannot be trusted.
Third, if citizens engage in corruption themselves they will conclude that others cannot
be trusted either. Although this framework is applied to social trust by Rothstein, it could
also be applicable to institutional trust. If corruption is seen as a part of everyday life,
including low level officials, citizens are more likely to conclude that higher officials are
corrupt as well. This would theoretically reduce trust in the impartiality and fairness of
the courts.
Several common theories for institutional trust fall under the umbrella I will call
“process-based theories”. These theories deal with substantive ways the judiciary’s
processes are followed and perceived as fair. The relevant factors in the processes of

the courts are procedural justice, fairness, and transparency. Procedural justice is the
idea that the courts should follow certain processes correctly, and if these processes are
just then the outcome will be just. Fairness relies on the courts treating people with
dignity and respect, and not showing clear biases toward an outcome. Transparency is
when the reasons for a court’s decision are communicated clearly and understandable
by all involved. Lack of transparency makes decisions seem arbitrary.
Process-based theories of judicial trust are popular in the literature. Tom Tyler
argues that the processes followed and the respect shown in an interaction are far more
relevant for public perception than the outcomes of cases (Tyler 2001). The outcome of
a case in this instance is whether the final decision was favorable to the respondent or
not. The theoretical grounds for why procedural justice and fairness are important is
because frequent interactions with fair institutions will increase trust in them (Tyler 1990,
Tyler 2001). This reflects an argument put forward by Bo Rothstein and Dietland Stolle,
who argue that frequent interaction with impartial government institutions increases
interpersonal trust as well (Rothstein and Stolle 2008). The reason the fairness of courts
is so important is because to many people they are one of the most frequently
interacted with sectors of government (Montinola 2008). Transparency has also been
shown to be a significant contributing factor to public trust of the judiciary
(Grimmelikhuijsen and Klijn 2015). Presumably, an opaque court would lead to less
understanding of the reasoning for decisions. So if there is a controversial or confusing
case, there would be little evidence to fight the notion that the court’s decision was
biased.

Another significant determining factor of public trust in the courts is the
awareness of the court in the general populace. In general, when citizens are more
aware of the functions and processes of the judiciary, they are more trusting of the
courts (Gibson et al 1998, Jamieson and Hardy 2008). This could be because learning
about the courts involves learning about the processes and motivations of judges. It
could also be because those who trust the courts are more likely to learn about them.
Either way, there is clear empirical evidence to show that awareness of the judiciary has
a significant correlation with trust in the judiciary.
One potential factor that could decrease public trust in the judiciary is the
partisanship of judges. Although public elections of judges are popular in the United
States, there is evidence to suggest that the presence of judicial elections harms the
public’s trust of the judiciary (Geyh 2003, Jamieson and Hardy 2008). This relationship
could be because of the significant presence of campaign ads in areas that directly elect
judges (Champagne 2001). These ads, especially attack ads, are often designed to
lower the credibility of candidates. So when candidates are elected, the campaign will
have lowered their public credibility. Partisan elections also lead voters to believe that
judges will have partisan biases, and not reflect the neutral values that are important for
building trust in the courts (Geyh 2003).
Caldeira argues that some of the most significant factors for public support of the
United States Supreme Court are actually largely external to the court’s behavior
(Caldeira 1986). For example, the Watergate scandal heavily increased public support
for the court, despite Congress being the primary responding actor in the scandal. This
is largely due to the increased visibility of the court, which he finds is generally

correlated with public support for the courts. Some other external factors that affect
public opinion of the court include inflation and presidential popularity. Judicial activism
was also found to be negatively correlated with public support for the judiciary, perhaps
as a result of activism signaling greater partisanship in the courts.
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) find that legal
formalism is highly significant in reducing judicial trust. Formalism can be defined as the
amount of hoops and formal rules one must jump through and satisfy when dealing with
the courts. Their cross-national study found that increased formalism led to increased
corruption and decreased fairness, access to justice, and honesty. However, high levels
of formalism in a society may be a chicken-or-the-egg scenario. When there is a high
level of judicial trust, informal relationships in the legal sphere are possible. However,
when judicial trust is low, highly formal and official processes are required to ensure
accountability. Due to the uncertain causal direction of formalism, it is unwise to view it
as a causal factor of judicial trust.
Roussey and Deffains (2012) found that the justice budget was highly significant
in determining judicial trust. This is theorized to be caused by a large justice budget
functioning as a signal to the public that the government is committed to securing
adequate justice. If the public believes there is a strong commitment toward justice, it
will be more likely to believe justice is being achieved.
Something apparently unique about the judiciary is that the nature of public trust
reacts differently toward it than other areas of government. For most institutions,
positive events and decisions increase the public’s trust in them while negative events
and decisions decrease trust. However, judiciaries do not seem to experience

decreases in trust when they do something unpopular (Gibson et al 1998,
Grimmelikhuijsen and Klijn 2015). This phenomenon gives support for the finding that
the age of the court is a small but statistically significant factor in public trust of the
courts (Gibson et al 1998). This finding could also be due to the courts learning how to
make publicly satisfactory decisions over time.
To conclude, trust in the judiciary has a multitude of possible causal factors.
These include corruption at high and low levels of government and society, procedural
justice and perceptions of fairness, justice budget, awareness of the courts, the
partisanship of judges, and external political factors that tie perceptions of the court with
perceptions of government. The primary focuses of this paper moving forward will be
corruption, judicial independence, and judicial activism.
As will be shown in the following paragraphs, Hungary and Poland have
experienced sharp declines in judicial independence and the ability of judges to check
the powers of other government entities, but have not experienced large changes in
governmental trust. This suggests that trust in the government is based on more than
the procedure based separation of powers and quality of government.

Research Method
This paper uses a process-based research method to compare Hungary and
Poland’s experiences from the end of communism until the modern day. This method
includes careful exploration of political and structural changes related to the courts and
ruling government parties in an attempt to understand how judicial independence
erodes over time. This is done by comparing the different methods utilized by the

Hungarian government run by the Fidesz party with the Polish government run by Law
and Justice, or PiS.
Historical process tracing will be utilized to view the broad historical context of
each nation, as well as specific aspects of their experiences under communist rule and
the subsequent transition to democracy. Special attention will be paid to the legislation
and rhetoric surrounding the judiciary during the transition to democracy. The substance
of the reforms and legislation, as well as who advocated for them and why they
supported them will also be studied.
After a discussion of each respective court’s establishment and structure is
concluded, a thorough analysis of the judiciary’s history up to the present will be
presented. This includes the elections of Fidesz and PiS and the changes that have
resulted in the court’s structure following these elections. Namely, the increased role of
Parliament in Hungary in selecting judges, as well as the decreased scope of judicial
review. In Poland, this includes the illegal and much decried court-packing by the Sejm,
as well as the frequent breach of constitutional rules by the Sejm.
Next, quantitative data will be compiled for multiple variables. These variables
will include the judicial framework and independence scores from Freedom House’s
Nations in Transit, composite quality of governance score from the World Bank’s World
Governance Indicators, Control of Corruption from the World Governance Indicators,
and trust in the government scores from the Eurobarometer. Changes in variables will
be considered and compared to events in the timeline of qualitative judicial changes.
Notably, trust in government will act as a substitute for trust in the judiciary. This
is due to the inconsistent nature of the Eurobarometer questionnaire regarding trust in

the judiciary, which resulted in missing data for several crucial years. Although clearly
not ideal, there is support in the literature for the belief that citizens often aggregate
government institutions together. The hope is that by looking at general trust in the
government, valuable information can still be gleaned regarding public trust in the
judiciary.
To offer a frame of reference to compare Hungarian and Polish data with, a
compound called “EU NiT Average” was created .This composite score is a simple
average of Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia’s scores. These nations are all post-communist and included in
the Eurobarometer Nations in Transit dataset. Importantly, all of these nations are also
members of the EU. This allows for the EU’s membership requirements to be controlled
for, since all of these nations must satisfy all of the same requirements to remain
members.

History
Pre-Democratic History
Poland and Hungary shared a number of historical similarities before their
transition to democracy. Both nations were large European powers before the 20th
century, occupied by Germany in World War II, and then liberated by the Soviet Union.
Both countries became Communist after this liberation and remained Communist until
the collapse of communism in 1989. Both nations formed republics in the years that
followed, and rewrote their constitutions to form democracies.

Prior to World War I, Hungary was part of the powerful Austro-Hungarian Empire.
One of the great powers of Europe, it had a pivotal role as the spark that ignited the
flame of war when Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne, was assassinated
(Clark 2014). Austria-Hungary was allied with Germany in the war, and dissolved into
smaller nations in the aftermath (Cornelius 2011). During the interwar period, the
Kingdom of Hungary was ruled by Myklos Horthy. Horthy was a former admiral, and
promoted generally conservative and nationalist principles (Sakmyster 1994). The
Kingdom of Hungary was close with Germany, and sided with the Axis during World War
II. When they considered leaving the war, Germany occupied Hungary and backed a
more Axis-sympathetic leader (Cornelius 2011). At the end of the war, a Soviet-backed
communist government was installed, and Hungary was declared a republic (Cornelius
2011).
The Hungarian People’s Republic was dominated by the Hungarian Socialist
Worker’s Party, which essentially acted as an extension of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union. The dominance of this party means that Hungary was essentially a
one-party state. Despite the domination of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party,
regular parliamentary elections were held (Pogony 1993). Communism was never
especially popular in the Hungarian People’s Republic, with large protests and
revolutions occurring throughout the communist regime (Matthews 2007). However, the
country was still dominated by the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party.
Hungary was more connected to the West than other Soviet nations through
trade and membership in international organizations such as the IMF (International
Monetary Fund). Hungary also had less central planning than other Soviet nations, and

actually had some movement toward neoliberal reforms as early as the 1960s (Fabry
2019). The transition to democracy was gradual but concluded with a new constitution
in 1989 that included a Constitutional Court, president, and elections.
Poland’s history shares many similarities with Hungary’s. Once one of the largest
powers in Europe, the Commonwealth of Poland was first partitioned between Austria,
Russia, and Prussia in 1772, and by 1795 it no longer existed on the map (US
Department of State). Poland became an independent nation again after World War I,
and its borders were defined by the Treaty of Versailles (US Department of State).
Interwar Poland was characterized by infant institutions struggling to establish
legitimacy. It began with the temporary dictatorship of Jozef Pilsudski, a military leader
from World War I (Bernhard 1998). There was a brief period of democracy before
Pilsudski seized power again with a coup d’etat in 1926 (Bernhard 1998). The invasion
of Poland by Germany in 1939 was the spark that caused the Allies to declare war
against Germany (Nolan 2011). Many Polish citizens were killed by the Nazi
government during the Holocaust, leaving Poland with little ethnic diversity
(Prazmowska 2010). Poland was eventually liberated by the Soviet Union, which
adopted Poland as a satellite state and supported a communist government.
The communist government of Poland lasted for a number of years. In the
beginning, the government showed many Stalinist tendencies politically and
economically (Pogany 1993, Fabry 2019). Despite the communist rule of Poland, the
Catholic church remained a major power in the country throughout the Soviet era and
generally advocated for policies contrary to the communist ideology (Mach 2007). Polish
Catholics rejoiced when Pope John Paul ll was chosen, as he was the first Pole to

become Pope (Ash 2002). Poland’s economy was largely focused on heavy industry
such as shipbuilding, and the Solidarity movement would eventually arise from the large
shipyards in Gdańsk (Sachs 1990, Kubow 2013).
Solidarity was a labor movement opposing communism that began in the
shipyards of Poland in the early 1980s (Kubow 2013, Ash 2002). It quickly grew to
become a major force for change in Poland, eventually convincing communist leaders to
compromise and legalize the Solidarity Party in the late 1980s through a series of round
table talks (Prazmowska 2010). Poland held democratic elections in 1989, and began
rapidly transitioning away from communism in 1990 through a set of reforms called
“shock therapy”.
Modern History
Hungary adopted a constitution in 1989 that was meant to remain in effect “until
the new Constitution is adopted” (Preamble, Act XX of 1949 Amended 1989: The
Constitution of the Republic of Hungary). This constitution was not entirely new, but was
instead a series of revisions to the Constitution adopted in 1949. While this was clearly
meant to be a transitional document, a new Constitution was not adopted until 2011 with
the Basic Law of Hungary. The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, hereafter
referred to as the 1989 Constitution, intended to establish a “multi-party system,
parliamentary democracy, and social market economy” (Preamble, Act XX of 1949
Amended 1989: The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary). It also outlined a
separate Constitutional Court with powers of judicial review.
The Constitutional Court outlined in the 1989 Constitution is officially nonpartisan,
has a broad jurisdiction over “any laws and other statutes it finds to be unconstitutional”,

and allows anyone to bring cases before it (Chapter IV, Act XX of 1949: The
Constitution of the Republic of Hungary). The selection of justices came from a
multi-partisan nominating committee and required two-thirds support in the Parliament,
which normally led to opposition parties needing to support the candidate as well
(Rose-Ackerman 2007).
In the early years of the court’s existence, the reality of the court matched up with
the picture drawn by the 1989 Constitution. The Constitutional Court frequently struck
down laws and statutes, and their rulings were usually accepted by all parties
(Boulanger 2005; Scheppele 2003). This suggests general respect for the
independence and power of the Constitutional Court. The Court became less activist as
the 1990s continued, but remained an important part of Hungary’s government structure
(Scheppele 2003).
In 2010, Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party won a dominant victory in the election,
giving them a supermajority in the Parliament. This was enough to introduce a new
Constitution, the Fundamental Law of Hungary, in 2011. This constitution featured
strongly partisan, nationalistic, and religious rhetoric in addition to giving distinct
advantages to Fidesz in future elections (Bozoki 2011). In the new Fundamental Law,
the committee in charge of nominating judges was made proportional to the party
shares in Parliament instead of multi-partisan, which allowed Fidesz to nominate
exclusively their own judges (Szente 2015). This has led to the Constitutional Court
filling up with pro-Fidesz judges. The size of the court was also increased, which led to
an even greater proportion of Fidesz-appointed judges (Szente 2015).

When Parliament passed a law in 2010 imposing a severe tax on severances
given out by the previous institution, the Constitutional Court declared the law
unconstitutional. In response, Parliament amended the Fundamental Law of Hungary to
remove the Constitutional Court’s power of judicial review of financial laws (Halmai
2019). This was possible because Fidesz controls over two-thirds of the seats in
Parliament, which is over the limit required to amend the constitution. This effectively
gives Fidesz complete control over the Fundamental Law of Hungary.
Removing the ability of the Constitutional Court to practice judicial review is a
clear departure from the early days of the Court, and a large shift in the balance of
government powers. In 2013. Parliament passed a constitutional amendment that
invalidated all decisions of the court made before 2012 (Szente 2015, Zeldin 2013). This
serves as another clear sign that Parliament has taken power away from the court.
Shifting the lens to Poland, the Sejm established an interim constitution in 1992
called the Small Constitution that would last until the ratification of The Constitution of
the Republic of Poland in 1997. The Small Constitution made frequent references to a
Constitutional Tribunal, but it did not define the Tribunal’s structure, powers, or
responsibilities (Poland: Constitution of 1992). In fact, the tribunal had been established
in 1986 by the communist leadership of Poland, and this institution was maintained
during the transition to democracy (Rose-Ackermann 2007). The 15 justices were
elected to fixed terms by a simple majority of the House of Representatives, or Sejm
(Rose-Ackerman 2007). The fact they were elected by a simple majority made this
institution vulnerable to partisanship. The Tribunal frequently constrained the

government and found statutes to be unconstitutional during this time (Rose-Ackermann
2007).
In 1997, a new Constitution was ratified that formally established the powers and
responsibilities of the Constitutional Tribunal. The Tribunal would be separate from the
Supreme Court and focused exclusively on reviewing government statutes and issues
of separation of powers with respect to constitutionality (The Constitution of the
Republic of Poland: As adopted by the National Assembly on 2nd April 1997). The
Tribunal was officially nonpartisan and its rulings were declared supreme and final. Only
government officials and those whose “constitutional rights have been infringed” are
eligible to bring cases before the Constitutional Court (Article 79, The Constitution of the
Republic of Poland: As adopted by the National Assembly on 2nd April 1997). This
means that the Tribunal’s effectiveness will largely be determined by how aggressive
political actors are in bringing cases before the court, as well as how willing they are to
hear cases originating from citizens who believe their rights have been violated
(Rose-Ackerman 2007). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the courts still appeared to
be actively constraining the government on constitutional grounds (Rose-Ackerman
2007, Sadurski 2018).
This state of judicial checks on other forms of government first showed its cracks
when the right-wing Law and Justice Party (PiS) was elected in 2015 (Sadurski 2018).
According to Sadurski, PiS gained control over the Constitutional Tribunal in two stages;
paralysis, and transformation into an enabler of government power (Sadurski 2018).
This was initially done by refusing to acknowledge three judges appointed by the
previous administration and appointing PiS friendly judges instead, effectively packing

the court in favor of PiS (Sadurski 2018, Kovacs and Scheppele 2018). The method and
justifications used for this packing of the court are complex, but it resulted in increased
legislative power over the appointment of judges and a de facto presidential veto that is
not stated in the Constitution (Sadurski 2018). There were also significant irregularities
in the election of the new president of the Constitutional Tribunal that have caused
some to question whether they were properly elected (Sadurski 2018, EU
P8_TA(2017)0442). However, the principal parties that could stop the improper election
of a judge to the Constitutional Tribunal are the Sejm and Constitutional Tribunal, both
of which at this point were controlled by PiS. These changes radically shifted the
balance of power between the Constitutional Tribunal and the rest of the government.
The Sejm then began passing a number of laws meant to restrict the powers of
the Constitutional Tribunal. While these were often struck down, it is emblematic of a
legislative effort to limit judicial powers. These efforts ceased once PiS was fully in
control of the Constitutional Tribunal (Sadurski 2018).
Changes to the judiciary were not limited to the Constitutional Tribunal. In 2017,
judicial reforms were passed with the intention to “enhance the democratic
accountability of the Polish judiciary” (Venice Commission Opinion No.977/2020). These
reforms included giving the Sejm complete control over the election of judges, the
Minister of Justice (a partisan position) the power to appoint and dismiss court
presidents at will, and the creation of two new court chambers with supremacy over the
rest of the Supreme Court (Venice Commission Opinion No.977/2020). Reforms were
later added that prohibited the right of judges to speak about political issues, required
judges to disclose any judicial organizations they are in, and prohibited criticizing a

judge or questioning the legitimacy of the judiciary (Venice Commission Opinion
No.977/2020). Implementing a gag rule against criticizing recent reforms is not typically
a sign that those reforms are popular. As it stands, the independence of the Polish
judiciary is a serious concern for Polish and European legal scholars.
When comparing Hungary and Poland, it is interesting to note the different
methods employed by Fidesz and PiS. In Hungary, Fidesz altered the structure and
powers of the judicial branch through constitutional amendments that were legally
passed by Parliament. Making changes through formal channels such as constitutional
amendments was possible because Fidesz had such a strong majority of Parliament. In
Poland, legally appointed judges were rejected by the PiS government and
unconstitutional actions were taken to put PiS friendly judges in place. The contrast
between these two methods of judicial reform highlights the multiple ways governments
can erode the separation of powers. The differences also highlight that although PiS did
not have as strong a majority in the government as Fidesz, they were able to
accomplish a similar degradation of the judiciary’s independence. The case of Poland
makes clear that changes to the constitution are not necessary to reduce constitutional
powers.

Quantitative Analysis
It is clear from following the substantial developments in the judiciaries of
Hungary and Poland that the status of their judiciaries has changed over the past 20
years. Both nations have experienced substantial shifts to the structure and powers of

their judiciaries. The processes for these changes are understood, so now it is time to
see if these shifts have led to changes in objective data.
Using the Freedom House Judicial Framework and Independence scores, the
change in the perceived independence of the judiciary over time can be tracked. The
“EU NiT Average” score is a composite of other post-communist countries in the
“Nations in Transit” dataset that are members of the EU. It includes Bulgaria, Croatia,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
Although Hungary and Poland are both NiT countries and EU members, they are
excluded from the “EU NiT Average” series. The series was restricted to EU members in
order to account for the fact that EU members have unique guidelines and requirements
of their judiciary put in place by the EU. By restricting it to only EU members, the
difference in supranational requirements is eliminated. On the dataset, a score of 0 is
the lowest, while a score of 7 indicates the highest score for judicial framework and
independence.

*Data collected from Freedom House, Nations in Transit Dataset 2005-2021. https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit

As this chart shows, the average score for post-communist EU members has
hovered around 5.5 since 2005. Hungary was above the average for EU member
Nations in Transit, but experienced a decline beginning in 2009, just before Fidesz was
elected. The decline continued until Hungary was scoring 4.25, well below the EU
average. Poland’s scores for judicial framework and independence matched the EU NiT
average until 2016, when it began experiencing a sharp decline. Poland scored a 3.25
in 2022, compared to its 6.00 in 2005; This decline coincides with the election of the PiS
government, which gained control in 2015.
This data shows clear support for the idea that the independence of the judiciary
has uniquely declined in Poland and Hungary over the last decade. Both nations were
remarkably consistent until the elections of the populist governments, before declining
dramatically. Other post-communist EU members have, on average, maintained

relatively constant scores of judicial framework and independence. This suggests that
the changes shown in the case studies are being clearly reflected in the Freedom
House data. The sharper decline in Poland than Hungary perhaps suggests that the
informal and illegal methods employed by the PiS government are more alarming for
international scholars than the formally correct methods used by Fidesz.
Moving on to the quality of governance, there is a less noticeable decline. The
data for this was taken from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators, a group of
data used to track the quality of government of many nations around the world. The
data ranges from 2.5, indicating the highest score possible, to -2.5, indicating the
lowest. Shown here is the average score of several metrics, including Control of
Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Political Stability and Absence of
Violence/Terrorism, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Voice and Accountability. The
Control of Corruption, Political Stability, Regulatory Quality, and especially the Rule of
Law measures are all connected to the effectiveness of the court system. The EU NiT
average series contains the same countries as the previous dataset.

*Data collected from World Bank, World Governance Indicators 2005-2020.
https://databank.worldbank.org/source/worldwide-governance-indicators

This data is far more volatile than the Freedom House data. The EU NiT average
has increased slightly over time. Hungary’s scores have declined steadily since 2006,
perhaps as part of the volatile years preceding the election of Fidesz. Since the election
of Fidesz, Hungary’s scores have continued to drop with very few exceptions. Poland
actually had QoG scores rising significantly faster than the EU NiT average until 2015.
Between 2015 and 2016, there was a sharp drop in scores that has continued until
2020. Now Poland’s QoG scores are lower than the EU NiT average by a small amount,
although they remain higher than Hungary’s. This data shows that although the quality
of government has been steadily increasing in other post-communist EU countries,
Poland and Hungary have been seeing the opposite effect. Despite the popularity of the
newly elected governments, objective indicators do not suggest that they are making

their countries better off as a whole. Hungary’s scores seem to have leveled off over
time, but Poland’s descent is more recent and still likely ongoing. It will be interesting to
see if Poland is able to control its’ quality of government in the near future.
Trust in the national government over time was taken from the Eurobarometer
dataset from 2005-2022. The EU NiT Average is composed of the same nations as
previous datasets.

*Data from Eurobarometer Standard Survey, 2005-2022, https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/browse/all/series/4961

The data here is not what one would expect from previous discussions of these
nations. Hungary’s trust in the government has been progressively growing, despite
increasing partisanship and the erosion of institutions. In the years prior to the 2010
election, the ruling party of Hungary was racked by numerous scandals, which
precipitated that overwhelming electoral victory of the Fidesz party. This could
potentially explain the decline in governmental trust, followed by the large spike when a

populist party swept to victory. Trust declined in the first year of the party, but has
steadily grown since then. Perhaps this is a sign of Viktor Orban’s continuing popularity
among Hungarians, as Orban and the Fidesz party have consistently received the
majority of votes.
In Poland, trust in the government has followed the EU NiT standard more
closely, but remains low at 28%. It does not seem as if the changes to Poland’s
Constitutional Court have had significant impacts on the citizenry’s trust in the
government, despite EU leadership and legal scholars sounding major alarms.
Both Fidesz and PiS may exhibit authoritarian tendencies, but as populist parties,
they are by definition popular. Both parties won enough of the vote to receive controlling
stakes in the government, and have continued to enjoy broad popular support among
the electorate. It would be reasonable to guess that many citizens are associating their
trust in the government with their approval of the ruling party, which helps explain the
rising levels of trust in the government under these populist regimes.
When analyzing the connection between judicial independence and
governmental trust, there appears to be a weakly significant negative correlation
between judicial independence and trust in the government. Chart 4 uses Freedom
House’s Judicial Framework and Independence scores compared to the
Eurobarometer’s Trust in Government with a 2 year lag. This lag was to account for the
fact that changes to judicial framework would likely take some time to affect the public
consciousness.

*Data from Freedom House Nations in Transit Dataset 2005-2020 https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit and
Eurobarometer Standard Survey 2007-2022 https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/browse/all/series/4961

As shown in chart 4, there is a weak negative correlation between judicial
independence and trust in the government. This runs contrary to the literature, which
tends to claim that independent institutions are perceived as more trustworthy than
partisan ones. Once again, the connection between the popularity of the ruling party
and the reduction of judicial independence may play a role in this finding. The elected
officials that are reducing the independence of the judiciary are not unpopular dictators,
they are popularly elected politicians with broad public support.

*Data from World Governance Indicators 2005-2020 https://databank.worldbank.org/source/worldwide-governance-indicators and
Eurobarometer Standard Survey 2007-2022 https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/browse/all/series/4961

Chart 5 compares the World Governance Indicators Control of Corruption scores
with the Eurobarometer Trust in Government results, with a two year lag in the trust
data. The analysis finds no significant relationship between the two. This runs contrary
to popular literature, which claims that perceptions of corruption are one of the most
significant factors in determining government trust. Once again, the popular nature of
the ruling parties may be significant in this result. Citizens may be willing to trust the
current ruling parties to do the right thing, and be happy that their popularly elected
officials are the ones in charge. It is significant that no data points in this set rise above
the 50% mark, meaning at no point did the majority of citizens in Hungary, Poland, or
the EU NiT average trust their government.

Conclusion
In this paper, I asked what could be learned from the Hungarian and Polish
experiences regarding judicial independence. A process-tracing research method was
utilized to track changes and significant developments in the power of the Hungarian
and Polish judiciaries. This showed the various methods governments can use to erode
the power and independence of their judiciaries, with Hungary utilizing formal
constitutional amendments while Poland’s other branches engaged in unconstitutional
behavior to pack the courts with supporting justices. These changes resulted in
significant decreases to the judicial independence and quality of government scores of
Hungary and Poland, but did not lead to large shifts in the trust in government.
In both these countries, it is perhaps notable that the institutions were incredibly
young when attacks from other branches began. Neither Poland nor Hungary had
strong democratic institutions at any point in their history until 1989, when communism
collapsed in Eastern Europe. Given the citizenry’s familiarity with authoritarian
governments before and during the Soviet occupation, perhaps both governments were
more vulnerable to populist authoritarian regimes. This familiarity in the Hungarian and
Polish people may help explain why trust in the government has been steadily rising
despite the decreasing strength of democratic institutions.
Most significantly, Poland and Hungary were both able to drastically reduce the
power and independence of their judiciaries despite their different methods and
situations. The Fidesz party in Hungary controlled over two-thirds of Parliament, and so
was able to write a new constitution and amend it without any input from the opposition.

This meant they were able to change the structure and independence of the judiciary
through official changes to the constitution. In contrast, the Law and Justice party had a
simple majority in the legislative branch, which was not enough to amend the
constitution. Therefore, Law and Justice had to pass statutes, pack the court with
friendly judges, and directly disobey the judiciary. Although these methods are less
official than the ones undertaken in Hungary, they were no less effective. In both
countries, the judiciaries quickly became a legitimizing institution for the government
that stopped effectively challenging laws it may have challenged before the shift. In both
countries, this change was remarkably quick, happening within three years of the
election of the respective parties. This demonstrates that significant shifts in the power
and independence of judiciaries can happen through a variety of processes and with
startling speed.
A surprising weak negative correlation was found between judicial independence
and trust in government. This runs contrary to most literature, and is perhaps a result of
the populist nature of the ruling governments. Citizens may have also disaggregated the
judicial branch from the rest of government in their mind, as suggested by various
scholars in the literature review. The correlation was incredibly weak, which suggests
that more data is necessary to make this result more robust. As it stands, it would not
be wise to place too much significance in the finding. Lastly, no correlation was found
between Control of Corruption and trust in government. A possible error in this result is
that estimated Control of Corruption is different from the citizen’s perceptions of
corruption, which would be more relevant for trust. Further research is needed on this
topic.

Given the structure of this project, it is naturally limited in scope. There are a
number of areas that deserve further research where this paper falls short. First, looking
at more countries would offer greater understanding of the methods and processes of
judicial reform. Hungary reduced the power of its judiciary through constitutional
change, while Poland limited its power through political maneuvering. Looking at other
nations would offer insight into other ways countries can strengthen or weaken their
judiciaries. The most obvious first candidate to look at is the Czech Republic. The
Czech Republic shares many historical similarities with Poland and Hungary, but its
judiciary has remained strong since its inception. Analysis of how and why this has
happened would be beneficial for legal scholars.
Second, greater exploration of the EU’s role in regulating the judiciaries of its
member countries is needed. This paper touched on the Venice Commission and
European Council decrying the changes in Hungary and Poland, but did not offer a
thorough examination of the EU’s power in either situation. The EU created new tools
after observing Hungary’s changing judicial powers, and implemented them when
Poland began reforming its judicial branch. Further research into the nature of these
tools, how effective they are, and the process for getting them passed is warranted.
Thirdly, the research in this paper was hindered by the inconsistent data of the
Eurobarometer Standard Survey series. Data exists regarding trust in the judiciary from
2005-2010, 2014, and 2016-2022. This required substituting Trust in Government data
into the analysis instead. While they are related, trust in the government and trust in the
judiciary are separate variables and may produce separate results. There are other

datasets that track trust in the judiciary with varying degrees of consistency, which could
prove useful in further research.
Poland and Hungary present fascinating case studies for any researcher
interested in judicial independence and separation of powers, largely due to the
significant changes that have occurred in the past decade. The future trajectory of both
these nations is unknown, but with undoubtedly present political scientists with valuable
information about the durability of democracy.
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